How can an honest party with in house psephologists miss this trend ? Kumar vishwas got a total of 25K votes as against 408K for Rahul and 300K for Smriti Irani in Amethi.
On January 30th, Nathuram Godse assasinated Mohandas Gandhi, the founding father of India, as Mahatma Gandhi conducted a multi-faith prayer meeting because Godse saw him as too accommodating to Muslim interests. Nathuram Godse had long been a member of multiple Hindu nationalist organizations, although the most powerful the RSS (Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh) has disclaimed any assosciation with Godse. Hindu nationalism has deep roots in the politics and history of India stretching back to the 19th century. However, the salience of Hindutva has increased dramatically since the election of Narendra Modi in 2014, who has championed an aggressively Hindu nationalist political philosophy. Modi has succesfully asserted the Hindutva agenda by mass disenfranchisement of suspected undocumented people in the state of Assam, the construction of a temple to Ram in Ayodhya on the rubble of a mosque destroyed by Hindu mobs, and the stripping of the state of Kashmir its political autonomy. However, Hindu nationalism goes beyond just Modi. The purpose of today's podcast episode is to discuss the historical roots, and deep consequences of discrimination against Muslims in India. Riots between Hindus and Muslims, especially where the overwhelming majority of deaths are among Muslims are not a new phenomenon in India. The city of Ahmedabad alone has seen three major waves of communal violence in 1969, 1985 and 2002 where approximately 500, 300 and 2,000 people, the overwhelming majority Muslim lost their lives. India has seen major riots both before and after elections. In recent years, we have seen the disturbing rise of lynchings by groups of vigilantes accusing Muslim men of slaughtering cows. Perhaps most disturbingly, the current Prime Minister of India, Narendra Modi, was Chief Minister of Gujarat at the time of the 2002 riots. Although there is no proof that he planned or had foreknowledge of the violence, he has maintained a conspicuous silence about the atrocities committed while he governed Gujarat. While violence between Hindus against Muslims is often described as the natural anger of the majority community against the minority community, there are many organizations such as the RSS, the VHP (Vishwa Hindu Parishad) and Bajrang Dal organizing people for violence. Underlying this violence between Hindus and Muslims are dangerous logics of communal political and economic competition. The Hindutva movement has long tried to make Hindu identity the most salient identity. For instance, from the 1960s to the 1980s, large numbers of textile workers in the city of Ahmedabad lost their jobs due to government economic mismanagement. Hindu textile workers in general fared worse than their Muslim counterparts as Muslim textile workers tended to be more experienced and were better positioned to set up powerloom businesses. Hindutva agitators worked hard to cast these economic struggles in a communal perspective, and blame Muslims for rising poverty. Moreover, participating in political violence often strengthens identification with the Hindutva movement. In the aftermath of the 2002 riots, the Hindu nationalist BJP gained more votes in areas hit hardest by communal violence, and those police officers who allowed violence to continue consistently saw promotion. There are economic factors behind these of violence as well. Violence against Muslims increases by 5% for every 1% reduction in the growth of Hindu incomes, while violence against Muslims increases dramatically as the economic gap between Hindus and Muslim decreases. The incomplete nature of Indian housing markets is especially relevant, as competition over rent controlled housing units has emerged as one of the most important drivers of Hindu Muslim violence as Muslims are often loathe to move away from rent from rent controlled units, while Hindus wish to acquire this property for themselves and their families. In some towns, such as Surat and many other coastal cities, community leaders worked to keep communal tensions at bay to protect businesses from violence. In many other places the desire to assert political, cultural and social superiority gets tightly wound together with economic motives, in order to ensure all conflict is seen as conflict between Hindus and Muslims. Discrimination against Muslims extends beyond the violence they face from Hindu mobs. India's political and economic system allows for social mobility to those groups that are able to politically organize to grab them. Muslims have been at a disadvantage politically since the partition of India, when the majority of Muslim leadership supported Pakistan and emigrated to Pakistan. Between 1980 and 2019, the percent of India's parliament that was Muslim declined from 10% to 4% despite the fact the Muslim share of the population increased from 11.8% to 14.8% during this same period. There has only been one Muslim Chief Minister of a non-Muslim state so far. The BJP, India's primary Hindu nationalist party, rarely fields Muslim candidates for office due to their own Hindu nationalist ideology. Even secular give little political power. On one hand, secular parties fear being tarred as "appeasing" Muslim interests by Hindu nationalists if they are too closely associated with Muslims, while secular parties can be confident that Muslim voters have nowhere to go even if they largely ignore Muslim issues. The lack of political power has real consequences for India's Muslim community. For example, India runs one of the largest systems of affirmitive action, known as reservations, in the world. However, Muslims have only recently gained limited access to reservations in 2011, although some states offer affirmative action at the state level. The low level of Muslim reservations is striking given many well off communities such as the Jats and Marathas have gained access to quotas showing that political power is more important than group socio-economic status when it comes reservations. The importance of lack of access to government jobs quotas become visible when one looks at Muslim struggles to get government jobs. Only 4% of public sector workers are Muslims, even though Muslims make up 14% of the Muslim population. Lack of access to government jobs is especially important because public sector jobs consistently pay more than double private sector jobs even after taking education into account. Moreover, there is substantial disparities in access to public infrastructure. For example, over 45% of Muslim majority villages have a bus stop, compared to 60% of non-Muslim majority villages, with similar disparities visible in many measures of public investment. Muslims face discrimination in the private sector as well, with formal employers three times more likely to reject identical resumes with Muslim names than Hindu ones, although other studies find no discrimination. I do not want to exagerrate the extent to which Muslims face discrimination in India. Muslims on average have incomes only around 6% lower than the national average. Muslims tend to be better off than Hindus in much of the south and west of India, and in many rural areas. Muslims are in particular disproportionately successful as small and medium size business owners. However, looking in the aggregate it is clear that Muslims have faced consistent downward mobility, with this mobility more evident in education rather than income. At independence, Indian Muslims were similar to Hindus in their level of education. Today, their levels of education are below that of the average Dalit , with declining educational mobility especially concentrated among the children of poor Muslims. The combination of deliberate discrimination, and downward socioeconomic mobility have had disastrous consequences for the Muslim community through the COVID-19 pandemic. India does not collect data on deaths by religion from COVID-19. Muslims make up a vastly disproportionate share of the urban poor, and it is the slums of India's megacities that have been hit hardest by COVID-19. For example, in Mumbai, one study of seroprevalence found that 57% of Mumbai slum dwellers had contracted COVID-19, compared to just 19% of non-slum population, with similar trends in other cities. Much of the Muslim concentration in slums can be explained by the systematic discrimination Muslims face in getting access to housing. On top of this, Muslims have disproportionately faced the burden of Islamophobia through COVID-19. One of the first major superspreading occurred at a convention of the Tablighi Jamaat, a conservative Islamic missionary organization. While it is likely that the Tablighi Jamaat behaved irresponsibly, many Hindutva populations have made not just the Tablighi Jamaat, but the broader Muslim community, a scapegoat for the rise of COVID-19. Prominent politicians have accused Muslims of launching a Corona-Jihad, and misleading videos of Muslim street vendors deliberately spitting on fruit have gone viral. Hospitals have rejected Muslim patients, and many Muslims have faced abuse while getting treatment. Unsurprisingly, resentment has grown in the Muslim community, with public health workers in Juhapura, a ghetto created by Muslims fleeing the Ahmedabad riots of 2002, pelted with stones as they tried to enforce curfew laws. The COVID-19 virus does not differentiate between Hindu and Muslim. Failure to contain COVID-19 in one community will inevitably lead to the spread of COVID-19 to other communities. Similarly, discrimination against Muslims will in the long run rebound against all Indians. Hindu nationalist political parties have gained substantial ground in Indian elections in recent years. If the dominance of parties not committed to secular ideals continues, it is likely structural discrimination against Muslims will be further entrenched. Selected Sources: Communal Riots in Gujarat: Report of a Preliminary Investigation, Ghanshyam Shah From Gandhi to Violence: Ahmedabad's 1985 Riots in Historical Perspective, Howard Spodek The Political Logic of Ethnic Violence: The Anti-Muslim Pogrom in Gujarat, 2002 Raheel Dhattiwala and Michael Biggs The Rise of Hindu Nationalism in India: The Case Study ofAhmedabad in the 1980s, Ornit Shani Economic growth and ethnic violence: An empirical investigation of Hindu–Muslim riots in India , Anjali Bohlen, Ernest Sergenti IMPLICATIONS OF AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF CONFLICT: Hindu-Muslim Violence in India , ANIRBAN MITRA AND DEBRAJ RAY Segregation, Rent Control, and Riots: The Economics of Religious Conflict in an Indian City, Erica Field, Matthew Levinson, Rohini Pande, and Sujata Visaria "UNFINISHED BUSINESS" ETHNIC COMPLEMENTARITIES AND THE POLITICAL CONTAGION OF PEACE AND CONFLICT IN GUJARAT, Saumitra Jha Adjustment and Accommodation: Indian Muslims after Partition, Mushirul Hasan Political Economy of Demand for Quotas by Jats, Patels, and Marathas Dominant or Backward? , Ashwin Deshpande WAGE DIFFERENTIALS BETWEEN THE PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTORS IN INDIA, Elena Glinskaya and Michael Lokshin The Legacy of Social Exclusion A Correspondence Study of Job Discrimination in India, Sukhadeo Thorat Labor market discrimination in Delhi: Evidence from a field experiment, Abhijit Banerjee , Marianne Bertrandy , Saugato Dattaz , Sendhil Mullainathan Wealth Inequality, Class and Caste in India, 1951-2012, Nitin Kumar Bharti Sachar Commission Report, Sachar Commission Intergenerational Mobility in India: Estimates from New Methods and Administrative Data, Sam Asher Paul Novosas Vidya, Veda, and Varna: The Influence of Religion and Caste on Education in Rural India, Vani Boorah, Sriya Iyer For whom does the phone (not) ring? Discrimination in the rental housing market in Delhi, India, Saugatta Datta www.wealthofnationspodcast.comhttps://media.blubrry.com/wealthofnationspodcast/s/content.blubrry.com/wealthofnationspodcast/China-Tech.mp3
On January 30th, Nathuram Godse assasinated Mohandas Gandhi, the founding father of India, as Mahatma Gandhi conducted a multi-faith prayer meeting because Godse saw him as too accommodating to Muslim interests. Nathuram Godse had long been a member of multiple Hindu nationalist organizations, although the most powerful the RSS (Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh) has disclaimed any assosciation with Godse. Hindu nationalism has deep roots in the politics and history of India stretching back to the 19th century. However, the salience of Hindutva has increased dramatically since the election of Narendra Modi in 2014, who has championed an aggressively Hindu nationalist political philosophy. Modi has succesfully asserted the Hindutva agenda by mass disenfranchisement of suspected undocumented people in the state of Assam, the construction of a temple to Ram in Ayodhya on the rubble of a mosque destroyed by Hindu mobs, and the stripping of the state of Kashmir its political autonomy. However, Hindu nationalism goes beyond just Modi. The purpose of today's podcast episode is to discuss the historical roots, and deep consequences of discrimination against Muslims in India. Riots between Hindus and Muslims, especially where the overwhelming majority of deaths are among Muslims are not a new phenomenon in India. The city of Ahmedabad alone has seen three major waves of communal violence in 1969, 1985 and 2002 where approximately 500, 300 and 2,000 people, the overwhelming majority Muslim lost their lives. India has seen major riots both before and after elections. In recent years, we have seen the disturbing rise of lynchings by groups of vigilantes accusing Muslim men of slaughtering cows. Perhaps most disturbingly, the current Prime Minister of India, Narendra Modi, was Chief Minister of Gujarat at the time of the 2002 riots. Although there is no proof that he planned or had foreknowledge of the violence, he has maintained a conspicuous silence about the atrocities committed while he governed Gujarat. While violence between Hindus against Muslims is often described as the natural anger of the majority community against the minority community, there are many organizations such as the RSS, the VHP (Vishwa Hindu Parishad) and Bajrang Dal organizing people for violence. Underlying this violence between Hindus and Muslims are dangerous logics of communal political and economic competition. The Hindutva movement has long tried to make Hindu identity the most salient identity. For instance, from the 1960s to the 1980s, large numbers of textile workers in the city of Ahmedabad lost their jobs due to government economic mismanagement. Hindu textile workers in general fared worse than their Muslim counterparts as Muslim textile workers tended to be more experienced and were better positioned to set up powerloom businesses. Hindutva agitators worked hard to cast these economic struggles in a communal perspective, and blame Muslims for rising poverty. Moreover, participating in political violence often strengthens identification with the Hindutva movement. In the aftermath of the 2002 riots, the Hindu nationalist BJP gained more votes in areas hit hardest by communal violence, and those police officers who allowed violence to continue consistently saw promotion. There are economic factors behind these of violence as well. Violence against Muslims increases by 5% for every 1% reduction in the growth of Hindu incomes, while violence against Muslims increases dramatically as the economic gap between Hindus and Muslim decreases. The incomplete nature of Indian housing markets is especially relevant, as competition over rent controlled housing units has emerged as one of the most important drivers of Hindu Muslim violence as Muslims are often loathe to move away from rent from rent controlled units, while Hindus wish to acquire this property for themselves and their families. In some towns, such as Surat and many other coastal cities, community leaders worked to keep communal tensions at bay to protect businesses from violence. In many other places the desire to assert political, cultural and social superiority gets tightly wound together with economic motives, in order to ensure all conflict is seen as conflict between Hindus and Muslims. Discrimination against Muslims extends beyond the violence they face from Hindu mobs. India's political and economic system allows for social mobility to those groups that are able to politically organize to grab them. Muslims have been at a disadvantage politically since the partition of India, when the majority of Muslim leadership supported Pakistan and emigrated to Pakistan. Between 1980 and 2019, the percent of India's parliament that was Muslim declined from 10% to 4% despite the fact the Muslim share of the population increased from 11.8% to 14.8% during this same period. There has only been one Muslim Chief Minister of a non-Muslim state so far. The BJP, India's primary Hindu nationalist party, rarely fields Muslim candidates for office due to their own Hindu nationalist ideology. Even secular give little political power. On one hand, secular parties fear being tarred as "appeasing" Muslim interests by Hindu nationalists if they are too closely associated with Muslims, while secular parties can be confident that Muslim voters have nowhere to go even if they largely ignore Muslim issues. The lack of political power has real consequences for India's Muslim community. For example, India runs one of the largest systems of affirmitive action, known as reservations, in the world. However, Muslims have only recently gained limited access to reservations in 2011, although some states offer affirmative action at the state level. The low level of Muslim reservations is striking given many well off communities such as the Jats and Marathas have gained access to quotas showing that political power is more important than group socio-economic status when it comes reservations. The importance of lack of access to government jobs quotas become visible when one looks at Muslim struggles to get government jobs. Only 4% of public sector workers are Muslims, even though Muslims make up 14% of the Muslim population. Lack of access to government jobs is especially important because public sector jobs consistently pay more than double private sector jobs even after taking education into account. Moreover, there is substantial disparities in access to public infrastructure. For example, over 45% of Muslim majority villages have a bus stop, compared to 60% of non-Muslim majority villages, with similar disparities visible in many measures of public investment. Muslims face discrimination in the private sector as well, with formal employers three times more likely to reject identical resumes with Muslim names than Hindu ones, although other studies find no discrimination. I do not want to exagerrate the extent to which Muslims face discrimination in India. Muslims on average have incomes only around 6% lower than the national average. Muslims tend to be better off than Hindus in much of the south and west of India, and in many rural areas. Muslims are in particular disproportionately successful as small and medium size business owners. However, looking in the aggregate it is clear that Muslims have faced consistent downward mobility, with this mobility more evident in education rather than income. At independence, Indian Muslims were similar to Hindus in their level of education. Today, their levels of education are below that of the average Dalit , with declining educational mobility especially concentrated among the children of poor Muslims. The combination of deliberate discrimination, and downward socioeconomic mobility have had disastrous consequences for the Muslim community through the COVID-19 pandemic. India does not collect data on deaths by religion from COVID-19. Muslims make up a vastly disproportionate share of the urban poor, and it is the slums of India's megacities that have been hit hardest by COVID-19. For example, in Mumbai, one study of seroprevalence found that 57% of Mumbai slum dwellers had contracted COVID-19, compared to just 19% of non-slum population, with similar trends in other cities. Much of the Muslim concentration in slums can be explained by the systematic discrimination Muslims face in getting access to housing. On top of this, Muslims have disproportionately faced the burden of Islamophobia through COVID-19. One of the first major superspreading occurred at a convention of the Tablighi Jamaat, a conservative Islamic missionary organization. While it is likely that the Tablighi Jamaat behaved irresponsibly, many Hindutva populations have made not just the Tablighi Jamaat, but the broader Muslim community, a scapegoat for the rise of COVID-19. Prominent politicians have accused Muslims of launching a Corona-Jihad, and misleading videos of Muslim street vendors deliberately spitting on fruit have gone viral. Hospitals have rejected Muslim patients, and many Muslims have faced abuse while getting treatment. Unsurprisingly, resentment has grown in the Muslim community, with public health workers in Juhapura, a ghetto created by Muslims fleeing the Ahmedabad riots of 2002, pelted with stones as they tried to enforce curfew laws. The COVID-19 virus does not differentiate between Hindu and Muslim. Failure to contain COVID-19 in one community will inevitably lead to the spread of COVID-19 to other communities. Similarly, discrimination against Muslims will in the long run rebound against all Indians. Hindu nationalist political parties have gained substantial ground in Indian elections in recent years. If the dominance of parties not committed to secular ideals continues, it is likely structural discrimination against Muslims will be further entrenched. Selected Sources:Communal Riots in Gujarat: Report of a Preliminary Investigation, Ghanshyam ShahFrom Gandhi to Violence: Ahmedabad's 1985 Riots in Historical Perspective, Howard SpodekThe Political Logic of Ethnic Violence: The Anti-Muslim Pogrom in Gujarat, 2002 Raheel Dhattiwala and Michael BiggsThe Rise of Hindu Nationalism in India: The Case Study ofAhmedabad in the 1980s, Ornit ShaniEconomic growth and ethnic violence: An empirical investigation of Hindu–Muslim riots in India , Anjali Bohlen, Ernest SergentiIMPLICATIONS OF AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF CONFLICT: Hindu-Muslim Violence in India , ANIRBAN MITRA AND DEBRAJ RAYSegregation, Rent Control, and Riots: The Economics of Religious Conflict in an Indian City, Erica Field, Matthew Levinson, Rohini Pande, and Sujata Visaria"UNFINISHED BUSINESS" ETHNIC COMPLEMENTARITIES AND THE POLITICAL CONTAGION OF PEACE AND CONFLICT IN GUJARAT, Saumitra JhaAdjustment and Accommodation: Indian Muslims after Partition, Mushirul HasanPolitical Economy of Demand for Quotas by Jats, Patels, and Marathas Dominant or Backward? , Ashwin DeshpandeWAGE DIFFERENTIALS BETWEEN THE PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTORS IN INDIA, Elena Glinskaya and Michael LokshinThe Legacy of Social Exclusion A Correspondence Study of Job Discrimination in India, Sukhadeo ThoratLabor market discrimination in Delhi: Evidence from a field experiment, Abhijit Banerjee , Marianne Bertrandy , Saugato Dattaz , Sendhil MullainathanWealth Inequality, Class and Caste in India, 1951-2012, Nitin Kumar BhartiSachar Commission Report, Sachar CommissionIntergenerational Mobility in India: Estimates from New Methods and Administrative Data, Sam Asher Paul NovosasVidya, Veda, and Varna: The Influence of Religion and Caste on Education in Rural India, Vani Boorah, Sriya IyerFor whom does the phone (not) ring? Discrimination in the rental housing market in Delhi, India, Saugatta Datta www.wealthofnationspodcast.comhttps://media.blubrry.com/wealthofnationspodcast/s/content.blubrry.com/wealthofnationspodcast/China-Tech.mp3 The post is Not Mine, but I dont have the source rn
Away from left cacophony using Veer Bhagat Singh to berate "bhakths", a few of his quotes dropped out by MSM. "Muslims lack a great deal of Indianness", Romanticizes Savarkar as "Coming in the wave of world-love, he used to stop walking on grass thinking the soft grass would be mowed under the feet"
Later in the same article, Bhagat Singh says," We want the Muslim brothers too to observe their faith but become Indian in the same way as Kamaal Turks are. This only will save India. We should look at the questions of language etc. from a very large point of view, not by making it poignant (religious) problems. In the entire 750-pages of his writings, even as Veer Bhagat criticized those killing Muslims in riots, he has never once criticized Savarkar or his Hindutva. Instead Veer Bhagat says: "World-lover is the hero whom we do not hesitate a little to call a fierce insurgent, staunch anarchist - the same heroic Savarkar. Coming in the wave of world-love, he used to stop walking on the grass thinking that the soft grass would be mowed under the feet." The above quote about Savarkar is from the martyr Sardar Bhagat Singh! Bhagat Singh Ji's article titled "Vishwa Prem" has been published twice in the issue of "Matwala" on 15th and 22nd November, 1926.
Are we forgetting to avenge whose death Veer Bhagat Singh assassinated John Sanders and in turn committed the ultimate sacrifice of his life? Lala Lajpat Rai, the revolutionary who was one of the founders of Hindu Mahasabha and who is now reviled by Congress. But moving ahead. Another instance of Veer Bhagat Singh promoting Veer Savarkar, the main promoted as the main villain of India today by Congress & leftists:
Then in March 1926, while writing about Madanlal Dhingra and Savarkar in Kirti, Bhagat Singh says - [2] "The impact of the Swadeshi movement reached England as well and Mr. Savarkar opened a house called 'Indian House'. Madanlal also became its member. .... One day, Mr. Savarkar and Madanlal Dhingra were talking for a long time. In a test of daring to give up his life, Savarkar pierced a big needle inn his hand by asking Madanlal to lay his hands on the ground, but Punjabi Veer did not even say ah. Tears filled the eyes of both. The two hugged each other. Ouch, how beautiful that time was. How invaluable and indelible that teardrop was! How beautiful that match was ! so glorious! What should we know about that emotion, what cowardly people who are afraid of even the thought of death, know how high, how holy and how revered are those who die for the sake of the nation! From the next day, Dhingra did not go to the Indian House of Savarkar and attended the Indian students' meeting organized by Sir Col. Wylie. Seeing this, the boys of the Indian house got very agitated and started calling him traitors, even traitor, but their anger was reduced by Savarkar saying that after all he had tried to even break his head to run our house. And due to his hard work, our movemet is going on, so we should thank him! Well, some days passed quietly. On July 1, 1909, there was a meeting at the Jahangir Hall of the Imperial Institute. Sir Curzon Wylie also went there. He was talking to two other people that Dhingra suddenly pulled out a pistol.He was put to sleep forever. Then after some struggle dhingra was caught. What to say after that, there was a worldwide cry!. Everyone started abusing dhingra wholeheartedly. His father sent a telegram from Punjab and said that I refuse to accept such rebel, rebellious and murderous man as my son. The Indians held large meetings. There were big speeches. Big proposals moved. All in blasphemy. But even at that time Savarkar was the hero who favored him openly. At first, he offered an excuse for not letting the motion pass against him that he is still on trial and we cannot call him guilty. Finally, when the vote was taken on this proposal, the Speaker of the House, Mr. Bipinchandra Pal, was saying that if it is deemed to be unanimously passed by everyone, then Savarkar Sahib stood up and started the lecture. Just then, an Englishman punched him in the mouth and said, "Look, how straight the English fist goes!" A Hindustani young man put a stick on the head of the Englishman, and said, "See, how straight the Indian club goes!" There was a noise. The meeting was left in between. The proposal remained unpassed. Well! "
**It includes only seven Indian authors, but only one of them whose more than one quotes have been included by Bhagat Singh in his diary, Savarkar. And all the six out of six quotes are from the same book, Hindupadapada Shahi. They are as follows: [7] 1) Sacrifice was adorable only when it was directly or remotely but reasonably felt to be indispensable for success. But the sacrifice that does not ultimately lead to success is suicidal and therefore had no place in the tactics of Maratha warfare (Hindupadapada Shahi, Page 256). 2) Fighting the Marathas is like fighting with the wind, is to strike on the water. [Hindupadapadshahi, 254] 3) that remains the despair of our age which has to write history without making it, to sing of valorous deeds without the daring abilities and opportunities without actualising them in life [Hindupadapada Shahi, 245–4] 4) Political slavery can be easily overthrown at any time. But it is difficult to break the shackles of cultural domination. [Hindupadpadshahi, 242-43] 5) No freedom!, whose smile we shall never resign. Go tell our invaders, the Danes, "That't sweeter to blood for an >age at thy shrine. Than to sleep but a minute in chains!", Quoted by Savarkar, the lines of Thomas Moore (Hindupadapada Shahi, 219) 6) "Rather get killed than converted", This was the prevalent call among Hindus at that time. But Ramdas stood up and exclaimed!, "No, not thus. Get killed rather than converted is good enough but better than that. Do not get either killed nor get violently converted. Rather, Kill the violent forces themselves and get killed while killing to conquer in the cause of righteousness." (Hindupadapada Shahi p.141-62) [8] While discussing the famous Jail Note Book of Bhagat Singh, historians Malwinder Jit Singh and Harish Jain state: Hindu Pad Padshahi by Veer Savarkar is one book which I would list among those he read thoroughly. May be for him, it was a re-reading as it was also found among the books seized by the police during raids on their hideouts after Sukhdev’s arrest. Does this mean Bhagat Singh was in complete agreement with Veer Savarkar? We do not know. The Hindutva of Savarkar was also fiercely non-partisan in its implementation. Perhaps it was a secularism that Bhagat Singh could sympathise with.
Ha, Bhagat Singh, hi ha! You galloped on the gallows, oh hai for us! Rajguru, you ha! Veer Kumar, martyr in National warfare Hi ha! Jai Jai Ha! This ah of today will win tomorrow Royal crown will come home Wore you crown of death before that. We will take arms in our hands The ones with you were killing the enemy! Who is a sinner? Who does not worship the unmatched sanctity of your intentions Go, martyr! We take oath with testimony. the fight with arms is explosive, We are remaining behind you Will fight and win freedom!! Hi Bhagat Singh, Hi Ha! [15]
It is alright if the leftists do not agree with views of Veer Bhagat, but we should not allow them to distort history.
On January 30th, Nathuram Godse assasinated Mohandas Gandhi, the founding father of India, as Mahatma Gandhi conducted a multi-faith prayer meeting because Godse saw him as too accommodating to Muslim interests. Nathuram Godse had long been a member of multiple Hindu nationalist organizations, although the most powerful the RSS (Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh) has disclaimed any assosciation with Godse. Hindu nationalism has deep roots in the politics and history of India stretching back to the 19th century. However, the salience of Hindutva has increased dramatically since the election of Narendra Modi in 2014, who has championed an aggressively Hindu nationalist political philosophy. Modi has succesfully asserted the Hindutva agenda by mass disenfranchisement of suspected undocumented people in the state of Assam, the construction of a temple to Ram in Ayodhya on the rubble of a mosque destroyed by Hindu mobs, and the stripping of the state of Kashmir its political autonomy. However, Hindu nationalism goes beyond just Modi. The purpose of today's podcast episode is to discuss the historical roots, and deep consequences of discrimination against Muslims in India. Riots between Hindus and Muslims, especially where the overwhelming majority of deaths are among Muslims are not a new phenomenon in India. The city of Ahmedabad alone has seen three major waves of communal violence in 1969, 1985 and 2002 where approximately 500, 300 and 2,000 people, the overwhelming majority Muslim lost their lives. India has seen major riots both before and after elections. In recent years, we have seen the disturbing rise of lynchings by groups of vigilantes accusing Muslim men of slaughtering cows. Perhaps most disturbingly, the current Prime Minister of India, Narendra Modi, was Chief Minister of Gujarat at the time of the 2002 riots. Although there is no proof that he planned or had foreknowledge of the violence, he has maintained a conspicuous silence about the atrocities committed while he governed Gujarat. While violence between Hindus against Muslims is often described as the natural anger of the majority community against the minority community, there are many organizations such as the RSS, the VHP (Vishwa Hindu Parishad) and Bajrang Dal organizing people for violence. Underlying this violence between Hindus and Muslims are dangerous logics of communal political and economic competition. The Hindutva movement has long tried to make Hindu identity the most salient identity. For instance, from the 1960s to the 1980s, large numbers of textile workers in the city of Ahmedabad lost their jobs due to government economic mismanagement. Hindu textile workers in general fared worse than their Muslim counterparts as Muslim textile workers tended to be more experienced and were better positioned to set up powerloom businesses. Hindutva agitators worked hard to cast these economic struggles in a communal perspective, and blame Muslims for rising poverty. Moreover, participating in political violence often strengthens identification with the Hindutva movement. In the aftermath of the 2002 riots, the Hindu nationalist BJP gained more votes in areas hit hardest by communal violence, and those police officers who allowed violence to continue consistently saw promotion. There are economic factors behind these of violence as well. Violence against Muslims increases by 5% for every 1% reduction in the growth of Hindu incomes, while violence against Muslims increases dramatically as the economic gap between Hindus and Muslim decreases. The incomplete nature of Indian housing markets is especially relevant, as competition over rent controlled housing units has emerged as one of the most important drivers of Hindu Muslim violence as Muslims are often loathe to move away from rent from rent controlled units, while Hindus wish to acquire this property for themselves and their families. In some towns, such as Surat and many other coastal cities, community leaders worked to keep communal tensions at bay to protect businesses from violence. In many other places the desire to assert political, cultural and social superiority gets tightly wound together with economic motives, in order to ensure all conflict is seen as conflict between Hindus and Muslims. Discrimination against Muslims extends beyond the violence they face from Hindu mobs. India's political and economic system allows for social mobility to those groups that are able to politically organize to grab them. Muslims have been at a disadvantage politically since the partition of India, when the majority of Muslim leadership supported Pakistan and emigrated to Pakistan. Between 1980 and 2019, the percent of India's parliament that was Muslim declined from 10% to 4% despite the fact the Muslim share of the population increased from 11.8% to 14.8% during this same period. There has only been one Muslim Chief Minister of a non-Muslim state so far. The BJP, India's primary Hindu nationalist party, rarely fields Muslim candidates for office due to their own Hindu nationalist ideology. Even secular give little political power. On one hand, secular parties fear being tarred as "appeasing" Muslim interests by Hindu nationalists if they are too closely associated with Muslims, while secular parties can be confident that Muslim voters have nowhere to go even if they largely ignore Muslim issues. The lack of political power has real consequences for India's Muslim community. For example, India runs one of the largest systems of affirmitive action, known as reservations, in the world. However, Muslims have only recently gained limited access to reservations in 2011, although some states offer affirmative action at the state level. The low level of Muslim reservations is striking given many well off communities such as the Jats and Marathas have gained access to quotas showing that political power is more important than group socio-economic status when it comes reservations. The importance of lack of access to government jobs quotas become visible when one looks at Muslim struggles to get government jobs. Only 4% of public sector workers are Muslims, even though Muslims make up 14% of the Muslim population. Lack of access to government jobs is especially important because public sector jobs consistently pay more than double private sector jobs even after taking education into account. Moreover, there is substantial disparities in access to public infrastructure. For example, over 45% of Muslim majority villages have a bus stop, compared to 60% of non-Muslim majority villages, with similar disparities visible in many measures of public investment. Muslims face discrimination in the private sector as well, with formal employers three times more likely to reject identical resumes with Muslim names than Hindu ones, although other studies find no discrimination. I do not want to exagerrate the extent to which Muslims face discrimination in India. Muslims on average have incomes only around 6% lower than the national average. Muslims tend to be better off than Hindus in much of the south and west of India, and in many rural areas. Muslims are in particular disproportionately successful as small and medium size business owners. However, looking in the aggregate it is clear that Muslims have faced consistent downward mobility, with this mobility more evident in education rather than income. At independence, Indian Muslims were similar to Hindus in their level of education. Today, their levels of education are below that of the average Dalit , with declining educational mobility especially concentrated among the children of poor Muslims. The combination of deliberate discrimination, and downward socioeconomic mobility have had disastrous consequences for the Muslim community through the COVID-19 pandemic. India does not collect data on deaths by religion from COVID-19. Muslims make up a vastly disproportionate share of the urban poor, and it is the slums of India's megacities that have been hit hardest by COVID-19. For example, in Mumbai, one study of seroprevalence found that 57% of Mumbai slum dwellers had contracted COVID-19, compared to just 19% of non-slum population, with similar trends in other cities. Much of the Muslim concentration in slums can be explained by the systematic discrimination Muslims face in getting access to housing. On top of this, Muslims have disproportionately faced the burden of Islamophobia through COVID-19. One of the first major superspreading occurred at a convention of the Tablighi Jamaat, a conservative Islamic missionary organization. While it is likely that the Tablighi Jamaat behaved irresponsibly, many Hindutva populations have made not just the Tablighi Jamaat, but the broader Muslim community, a scapegoat for the rise of COVID-19. Prominent politicians have accused Muslims of launching a Corona-Jihad, and misleading videos of Muslim street vendors deliberately spitting on fruit have gone viral. Hospitals have rejected Muslim patients, and many Muslims have faced abuse while getting treatment. Unsurprisingly, resentment has grown in the Muslim community, with public health workers in Juhapura, a ghetto created by Muslims fleeing the Ahmedabad riots of 2002, pelted with stones as they tried to enforce curfew laws. The COVID-19 virus does not differentiate between Hindu and Muslim. Failure to contain COVID-19 in one community will inevitably lead to the spread of COVID-19 to other communities. Similarly, discrimination against Muslims will in the long run rebound against all Indians. Hindu nationalist political parties have gained substantial ground in Indian elections in recent years. If the dominance of parties not committed to secular ideals continues, it is likely structural discrimination against Muslims will be further entrenched. Selected Sources: Communal Riots in Gujarat: Report of a Preliminary Investigation, Ghanshyam Shah From Gandhi to Violence: Ahmedabad's 1985 Riots in Historical Perspective, Howard Spodek The Political Logic of Ethnic Violence: The Anti-Muslim Pogrom in Gujarat, 2002 Raheel Dhattiwala and Michael Biggs The Rise of Hindu Nationalism in India: The Case Study ofAhmedabad in the 1980s, Ornit Shani Economic growth and ethnic violence: An empirical investigation of Hindu–Muslim riots in India , Anjali Bohlen, Ernest Sergenti IMPLICATIONS OF AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF CONFLICT: Hindu-Muslim Violence in India , ANIRBAN MITRA AND DEBRAJ RAY Segregation, Rent Control, and Riots: The Economics of Religious Conflict in an Indian City, Erica Field, Matthew Levinson, Rohini Pande, and Sujata Visaria "UNFINISHED BUSINESS" ETHNIC COMPLEMENTARITIES AND THE POLITICAL CONTAGION OF PEACE AND CONFLICT IN GUJARAT, Saumitra Jha Adjustment and Accommodation: Indian Muslims after Partition, Mushirul Hasan Political Economy of Demand for Quotas by Jats, Patels, and Marathas Dominant or Backward? , Ashwin Deshpande WAGE DIFFERENTIALS BETWEEN THE PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTORS IN INDIA, Elena Glinskaya and Michael Lokshin The Legacy of Social Exclusion A Correspondence Study of Job Discrimination in India, Sukhadeo Thorat Labor market discrimination in Delhi: Evidence from a field experiment, Abhijit Banerjee , Marianne Bertrandy , Saugato Dattaz , Sendhil Mullainathan Wealth Inequality, Class and Caste in India, 1951-2012, Nitin Kumar Bharti Sachar Commission Report, Sachar Commission Intergenerational Mobility in India: Estimates from New Methods and Administrative Data, Sam Asher Paul Novosas Vidya, Veda, and Varna: The Influence of Religion and Caste on Education in Rural India, Vani Boorah, Sriya Iyer For whom does the phone (not) ring? Discrimination in the rental housing market in Delhi, India, Saugatta Datta www.wealthofnationspodcast.comhttps://media.blubrry.com/wealthofnationspodcast/s/content.blubrry.com/wealthofnationspodcast/China-Tech.mp3
On January 30th, Nathuram Godse assasinated Mohandas Gandhi, the founding father of India, as Mahatma Gandhi conducted a multi-faith prayer meeting because Godse saw him as too accommodating to Muslim interests. Nathuram Godse had long been a member of multiple Hindu nationalist organizations, although the most powerful the RSS (Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh) has disclaimed any assosciation with Godse. Hindu nationalism has deep roots in the politics and history of India stretching back to the 19th century. However, the salience of Hindutva has increased dramatically since the election of Narendra Modi in 2014, who has championed an aggressively Hindu nationalist political philosophy. Modi has succesfully asserted the Hindutva agenda by mass disenfranchisement of suspected undocumented people in the state of Assam, the construction of a temple to Ram in Ayodhya on the rubble of a mosque destroyed by Hindu mobs, and the stripping of the state of Kashmir its political autonomy. However, Hindu nationalism goes beyond just Modi. The purpose of today's podcast episode is to discuss the historical roots, and deep consequences of discrimination against Muslims in India. Riots between Hindus and Muslims, especially where the overwhelming majority of deaths are among Muslims are not a new phenomenon in India. The city of Ahmedabad alone has seen three major waves of communal violence in 1969, 1985 and 2002 where approximately 500, 300 and 2,000 people, the overwhelming majority Muslim lost their lives. India has seen major riots both before and after elections. In recent years, we have seen the disturbing rise of lynchings by groups of vigilantes accusing Muslim men of slaughtering cows. Perhaps most disturbingly, the current Prime Minister of India, Narendra Modi, was Chief Minister of Gujarat at the time of the 2002 riots. Although there is no proof that he planned or had foreknowledge of the violence, he has maintained a conspicuous silence about the atrocities committed while he governed Gujarat. While violence between Hindus against Muslims is often described as the natural anger of the majority community against the minority community, there are many organizations such as the RSS, the VHP (Vishwa Hindu Parishad) and Bajrang Dal organizing people for violence. Underlying this violence between Hindus and Muslims are dangerous logics of communal political and economic competition. The Hindutva movement has long tried to make Hindu identity the most salient identity. For instance, from the 1960s to the 1980s, large numbers of textile workers in the city of Ahmedabad lost their jobs due to government economic mismanagement. Hindu textile workers in general fared worse than their Muslim counterparts as Muslim textile workers tended to be more experienced and were better positioned to set up powerloom businesses. Hindutva agitators worked hard to cast these economic struggles in a communal perspective, and blame Muslims for rising poverty. Moreover, participating in political violence often strengthens identification with the Hindutva movement. In the aftermath of the 2002 riots, the Hindu nationalist BJP gained more votes in areas hit hardest by communal violence, and those police officers who allowed violence to continue consistently saw promotion. There are economic factors behind these of violence as well. Violence against Muslims increases by 5% for every 1% reduction in the growth of Hindu incomes, while violence against Muslims increases dramatically as the economic gap between Hindus and Muslim decreases. The incomplete nature of Indian housing markets is especially relevant, as competition over rent controlled housing units has emerged as one of the most important drivers of Hindu Muslim violence as Muslims are often loathe to move away from rent from rent controlled units, while Hindus wish to acquire this property for themselves and their families. In some towns, such as Surat and many other coastal cities, community leaders worked to keep communal tensions at bay to protect businesses from violence. In many other places the desire to assert political, cultural and social superiority gets tightly wound together with economic motives, in order to ensure all conflict is seen as conflict between Hindus and Muslims. Discrimination against Muslims extends beyond the violence they face from Hindu mobs. India's political and economic system allows for social mobility to those groups that are able to politically organize to grab them. Muslims have been at a disadvantage politically since the partition of India, when the majority of Muslim leadership supported Pakistan and emigrated to Pakistan. Between 1980 and 2019, the percent of India's parliament that was Muslim declined from 10% to 4% despite the fact the Muslim share of the population increased from 11.8% to 14.8% during this same period. There has only been one Muslim Chief Minister of a non-Muslim state so far. The BJP, India's primary Hindu nationalist party, rarely fields Muslim candidates for office due to their own Hindu nationalist ideology. Even secular give little political power. On one hand, secular parties fear being tarred as "appeasing" Muslim interests by Hindu nationalists if they are too closely associated with Muslims, while secular parties can be confident that Muslim voters have nowhere to go even if they largely ignore Muslim issues. The lack of political power has real consequences for India's Muslim community. For example, India runs one of the largest systems of affirmitive action, known as reservations, in the world. However, Muslims have only recently gained limited access to reservations in 2011, although some states offer affirmative action at the state level. The low level of Muslim reservations is striking given many well off communities such as the Jats and Marathas have gained access to quotas showing that political power is more important than group socio-economic status when it comes reservations. The importance of lack of access to government jobs quotas become visible when one looks at Muslim struggles to get government jobs. Only 4% of public sector workers are Muslims, even though Muslims make up 14% of the Muslim population. Lack of access to government jobs is especially important because public sector jobs consistently pay more than double private sector jobs even after taking education into account. Moreover, there is substantial disparities in access to public infrastructure. For example, over 45% of Muslim majority villages have a bus stop, compared to 60% of non-Muslim majority villages, with similar disparities visible in many measures of public investment. Muslims face discrimination in the private sector as well, with formal employers three times more likely to reject identical resumes with Muslim names than Hindu ones, although other studies find no discrimination. I do not want to exagerrate the extent to which Muslims face discrimination in India. Muslims on average have incomes only around 6% lower than the national average. Muslims tend to be better off than Hindus in much of the south and west of India, and in many rural areas. Muslims are in particular disproportionately successful as small and medium size business owners. However, looking in the aggregate it is clear that Muslims have faced consistent downward mobility, with this mobility more evident in education rather than income. At independence, Indian Muslims were similar to Hindus in their level of education. Today, their levels of education are below that of the average Dalit , with declining educational mobility especially concentrated among the children of poor Muslims. The combination of deliberate discrimination, and downward socioeconomic mobility have had disastrous consequences for the Muslim community through the COVID-19 pandemic. India does not collect data on deaths by religion from COVID-19. Muslims make up a vastly disproportionate share of the urban poor, and it is the slums of India's megacities that have been hit hardest by COVID-19. For example, in Mumbai, one study of seroprevalence found that 57% of Mumbai slum dwellers had contracted COVID-19, compared to just 19% of non-slum population, with similar trends in other cities. Much of the Muslim concentration in slums can be explained by the systematic discrimination Muslims face in getting access to housing. On top of this, Muslims have disproportionately faced the burden of Islamophobia through COVID-19. One of the first major superspreading occurred at a convention of the Tablighi Jamaat, a conservative Islamic missionary organization. While it is likely that the Tablighi Jamaat behaved irresponsibly, many Hindutva populations have made not just the Tablighi Jamaat, but the broader Muslim community, a scapegoat for the rise of COVID-19. Prominent politicians have accused Muslims of launching a Corona-Jihad, and misleading videos of Muslim street vendors deliberately spitting on fruit have gone viral. Hospitals have rejected Muslim patients, and many Muslims have faced abuse while getting treatment. Unsurprisingly, resentment has grown in the Muslim community, with public health workers in Juhapura, a ghetto created by Muslims fleeing the Ahmedabad riots of 2002, pelted with stones as they tried to enforce curfew laws. The COVID-19 virus does not differentiate between Hindu and Muslim. Failure to contain COVID-19 in one community will inevitably lead to the spread of COVID-19 to other communities. Similarly, discrimination against Muslims will in the long run rebound against all Indians. Hindu nationalist political parties have gained substantial ground in Indian elections in recent years. If the dominance of parties not committed to secular ideals continues, it is likely structural discrimination against Muslims will be further entrenched. Selected Sources:Communal Riots in Gujarat: Report of a Preliminary Investigation, Ghanshyam ShahFrom Gandhi to Violence: Ahmedabad's 1985 Riots in Historical Perspective, Howard SpodekThe Political Logic of Ethnic Violence: The Anti-Muslim Pogrom in Gujarat, 2002 Raheel Dhattiwala and Michael BiggsThe Rise of Hindu Nationalism in India: The Case Study ofAhmedabad in the 1980s, Ornit ShaniEconomic growth and ethnic violence: An empirical investigation of Hindu–Muslim riots in India , Anjali Bohlen, Ernest SergentiIMPLICATIONS OF AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF CONFLICT: Hindu-Muslim Violence in India , ANIRBAN MITRA AND DEBRAJ RAYSegregation, Rent Control, and Riots: The Economics of Religious Conflict in an Indian City, Erica Field, Matthew Levinson, Rohini Pande, and Sujata Visaria"UNFINISHED BUSINESS" ETHNIC COMPLEMENTARITIES AND THE POLITICAL CONTAGION OF PEACE AND CONFLICT IN GUJARAT, Saumitra JhaAdjustment and Accommodation: Indian Muslims after Partition, Mushirul HasanPolitical Economy of Demand for Quotas by Jats, Patels, and Marathas Dominant or Backward? , Ashwin DeshpandeWAGE DIFFERENTIALS BETWEEN THE PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTORS IN INDIA, Elena Glinskaya and Michael LokshinThe Legacy of Social Exclusion A Correspondence Study of Job Discrimination in India, Sukhadeo ThoratLabor market discrimination in Delhi: Evidence from a field experiment, Abhijit Banerjee , Marianne Bertrandy , Saugato Dattaz , Sendhil MullainathanWealth Inequality, Class and Caste in India, 1951-2012, Nitin Kumar BhartiSachar Commission Report, Sachar CommissionIntergenerational Mobility in India: Estimates from New Methods and Administrative Data, Sam Asher Paul NovosasVidya, Veda, and Varna: The Influence of Religion and Caste on Education in Rural India, Vani Boorah, Sriya IyerFor whom does the phone (not) ring? Discrimination in the rental housing market in Delhi, India, Saugatta Datta www.wealthofnationspodcast.comhttps://media.blubrry.com/wealthofnationspodcast/s/content.blubrry.com/wealthofnationspodcast/China-Tech.mp3 The post is Not Mine, but I dont have the source rn
Away from left cacophony using Veer Bhagat Singh to berate "bhakths", a few of his quotes dropped out by MSM. "Muslims lack a great deal of Indianness", Romanticizes Savarkar as "Coming in the wave of world-love, he used to stop walking on grass thinking the soft grass would be mowed under the feet"
Later in the same article, Bhagat Singh says," We want the Muslim brothers too to observe their faith but become Indian in the same way as Kamaal Turks are. This only will save India. We should look at the questions of language etc. from a very large point of view, not by making it poignant (religious) problems. In the entire 750-pages of his writings, even as Veer Bhagat criticized those killing Muslims in riots, he has never once criticized Savarkar or his Hindutva. Instead Veer Bhagat says: "World-lover is the hero whom we do not hesitate a little to call a fierce insurgent, staunch anarchist - the same heroic Savarkar. Coming in the wave of world-love, he used to stop walking on the grass thinking that the soft grass would be mowed under the feet." The above quote about Savarkar is from the martyr Sardar Bhagat Singh! Bhagat Singh Ji's article titled "Vishwa Prem" has been published twice in the issue of "Matwala" on 15th and 22nd November, 1926.
Are we forgetting to avenge whose death Veer Bhagat Singh assassinated John Sanders and in turn committed the ultimate sacrifice of his life? Lala Lajpat Rai, the revolutionary who was one of the founders of Hindu Mahasabha and who is now reviled by Congress. But moving ahead. Another instance of Veer Bhagat Singh promoting Veer Savarkar, the main promoted as the main villain of India today by Congress & leftists:
Then in March 1926, while writing about Madanlal Dhingra and Savarkar in Kirti, Bhagat Singh says - [2] "The impact of the Swadeshi movement reached England as well and Mr. Savarkar opened a house called 'Indian House'. Madanlal also became its member. .... One day, Mr. Savarkar and Madanlal Dhingra were talking for a long time. In a test of daring to give up his life, Savarkar pierced a big needle inn his hand by asking Madanlal to lay his hands on the ground, but Punjabi Veer did not even say ah. Tears filled the eyes of both. The two hugged each other. Ouch, how beautiful that time was. How invaluable and indelible that teardrop was! How beautiful that match was ! so glorious! What should we know about that emotion, what cowardly people who are afraid of even the thought of death, know how high, how holy and how revered are those who die for the sake of the nation! From the next day, Dhingra did not go to the Indian House of Savarkar and attended the Indian students' meeting organized by Sir Col. Wylie. Seeing this, the boys of the Indian house got very agitated and started calling him traitors, even traitor, but their anger was reduced by Savarkar saying that after all he had tried to even break his head to run our house. And due to his hard work, our movemet is going on, so we should thank him! Well, some days passed quietly. On July 1, 1909, there was a meeting at the Jahangir Hall of the Imperial Institute. Sir Curzon Wylie also went there. He was talking to two other people that Dhingra suddenly pulled out a pistol.He was put to sleep forever. Then after some struggle dhingra was caught. What to say after that, there was a worldwide cry!. Everyone started abusing dhingra wholeheartedly. His father sent a telegram from Punjab and said that I refuse to accept such rebel, rebellious and murderous man as my son. The Indians held large meetings. There were big speeches. Big proposals moved. All in blasphemy. But even at that time Savarkar was the hero who favored him openly. At first, he offered an excuse for not letting the motion pass against him that he is still on trial and we cannot call him guilty. Finally, when the vote was taken on this proposal, the Speaker of the House, Mr. Bipinchandra Pal, was saying that if it is deemed to be unanimously passed by everyone, then Savarkar Sahib stood up and started the lecture. Just then, an Englishman punched him in the mouth and said, "Look, how straight the English fist goes!" A Hindustani young man put a stick on the head of the Englishman, and said, "See, how straight the Indian club goes!" There was a noise. The meeting was left in between. The proposal remained unpassed. Well! "
**It includes only seven Indian authors, but only one of them whose more than one quotes have been included by Bhagat Singh in his diary, Savarkar. And all the six out of six quotes are from the same book, Hindupadapada Shahi. They are as follows: [7] 1) Sacrifice was adorable only when it was directly or remotely but reasonably felt to be indispensable for success. But the sacrifice that does not ultimately lead to success is suicidal and therefore had no place in the tactics of Maratha warfare (Hindupadapada Shahi, Page 256). 2) Fighting the Marathas is like fighting with the wind, is to strike on the water. [Hindupadapadshahi, 254] 3) that remains the despair of our age which has to write history without making it, to sing of valorous deeds without the daring abilities and opportunities without actualising them in life [Hindupadapada Shahi, 245–4] 4) Political slavery can be easily overthrown at any time. But it is difficult to break the shackles of cultural domination. [Hindupadpadshahi, 242-43] 5) No freedom!, whose smile we shall never resign. Go tell our invaders, the Danes, "That't sweeter to blood for an >age at thy shrine. Than to sleep but a minute in chains!", Quoted by Savarkar, the lines of Thomas Moore (Hindupadapada Shahi, 219) 6) "Rather get killed than converted", This was the prevalent call among Hindus at that time. But Ramdas stood up and exclaimed!, "No, not thus. Get killed rather than converted is good enough but better than that. Do not get either killed nor get violently converted. Rather, Kill the violent forces themselves and get killed while killing to conquer in the cause of righteousness." (Hindupadapada Shahi p.141-62) [8] While discussing the famous Jail Note Book of Bhagat Singh, historians Malwinder Jit Singh and Harish Jain state: Hindu Pad Padshahi by Veer Savarkar is one book which I would list among those he read thoroughly. May be for him, it was a re-reading as it was also found among the books seized by the police during raids on their hideouts after Sukhdev’s arrest. Does this mean Bhagat Singh was in complete agreement with Veer Savarkar? We do not know. The Hindutva of Savarkar was also fiercely non-partisan in its implementation. Perhaps it was a secularism that Bhagat Singh could sympathise with.
Ha, Bhagat Singh, hi ha! You galloped on the gallows, oh hai for us! Rajguru, you ha! Veer Kumar, martyr in National warfare Hi ha! Jai Jai Ha! This ah of today will win tomorrow Royal crown will come home Wore you crown of death before that. We will take arms in our hands The ones with you were killing the enemy! Who is a sinner? Who does not worship the unmatched sanctity of your intentions Go, martyr! We take oath with testimony. the fight with arms is explosive, We are remaining behind you Will fight and win freedom!! Hi Bhagat Singh, Hi Ha! [15]
It is alright if the leftists do not agree with views of Veer Bhagat, but we should not allow them to distort history.
Away from left cacophony using Veer Bhagat Singh to berate "bhakths", a few of his quotes dropped out by MSM. "Muslims lack a great deal of Indianness", Romanticizes Savarkar as "Coming in the wave of world-love, he used to stop walking on grass thinking the soft grass would be mowed under the feet"
Later in the same article, Bhagat Singh says," We want the Muslim brothers too to observe their faith but become Indian in the same way as Kamaal Turks are. This only will save India. We should look at the questions of language etc. from a very large point of view, not by making it poignant (religious) problems. In the entire 750-pages of his writings, even as Veer Bhagat criticized those killing Muslims in riots, he has never once criticized Savarkar or his Hindutva. Instead Veer Bhagat says: "World-lover is the hero whom we do not hesitate a little to call a fierce insurgent, staunch anarchist - the same heroic Savarkar. Coming in the wave of world-love, he used to stop walking on the grass thinking that the soft grass would be mowed under the feet." The above quote about Savarkar is from the martyr Sardar Bhagat Singh! Bhagat Singh Ji's article titled "Vishwa Prem" has been published twice in the issue of "Matwala" on 15th and 22nd November, 1926.
Are we forgetting to avenge whose death Veer Bhagat Singh assassinated John Sanders and in turn committed the ultimate sacrifice of his life? Lala Lajpat Rai, the revolutionary who was one of the founders of Hindu Mahasabha and who is now reviled by Congress. But moving ahead. Another instance of Veer Bhagat Singh promoting Veer Savarkar, the main promoted as the main villain of India today by Congress & leftists:
Then in March 1926, while writing about Madanlal Dhingra and Savarkar in Kirti, Bhagat Singh says - [2] "The impact of the Swadeshi movement reached England as well and Mr. Savarkar opened a house called 'Indian House'. Madanlal also became its member. .... One day, Mr. Savarkar and Madanlal Dhingra were talking for a long time. In a test of daring to give up his life, Savarkar pierced a big needle inn his hand by asking Madanlal to lay his hands on the ground, but Punjabi Veer did not even say ah. Tears filled the eyes of both. The two hugged each other. Ouch, how beautiful that time was. How invaluable and indelible that teardrop was! How beautiful that match was ! so glorious! What should we know about that emotion, what cowardly people who are afraid of even the thought of death, know how high, how holy and how revered are those who die for the sake of the nation! From the next day, Dhingra did not go to the Indian House of Savarkar and attended the Indian students' meeting organized by Sir Col. Wylie. Seeing this, the boys of the Indian house got very agitated and started calling him traitors, even traitor, but their anger was reduced by Savarkar saying that after all he had tried to even break his head to run our house. And due to his hard work, our movemet is going on, so we should thank him! Well, some days passed quietly. On July 1, 1909, there was a meeting at the Jahangir Hall of the Imperial Institute. Sir Curzon Wylie also went there. He was talking to two other people that Dhingra suddenly pulled out a pistol.He was put to sleep forever. Then after some struggle dhingra was caught. What to say after that, there was a worldwide cry!. Everyone started abusing dhingra wholeheartedly. His father sent a telegram from Punjab and said that I refuse to accept such rebel, rebellious and murderous man as my son. The Indians held large meetings. There were big speeches. Big proposals moved. All in blasphemy. But even at that time Savarkar was the hero who favored him openly. At first, he offered an excuse for not letting the motion pass against him that he is still on trial and we cannot call him guilty. Finally, when the vote was taken on this proposal, the Speaker of the House, Mr. Bipinchandra Pal, was saying that if it is deemed to be unanimously passed by everyone, then Savarkar Sahib stood up and started the lecture. Just then, an Englishman punched him in the mouth and said, "Look, how straight the English fist goes!" A Hindustani young man put a stick on the head of the Englishman, and said, "See, how straight the Indian club goes!" There was a noise. The meeting was left in between. The proposal remained unpassed. Well! "
**It includes only seven Indian authors, but only one of them whose more than one quotes have been included by Bhagat Singh in his diary, Savarkar. And all the six out of six quotes are from the same book, Hindupadapada Shahi. They are as follows: [7] 1) Sacrifice was adorable only when it was directly or remotely but reasonably felt to be indispensable for success. But the sacrifice that does not ultimately lead to success is suicidal and therefore had no place in the tactics of Maratha warfare (Hindupadapada Shahi, Page 256). 2) Fighting the Marathas is like fighting with the wind, is to strike on the water. [Hindupadapadshahi, 254] 3) that remains the despair of our age which has to write history without making it, to sing of valorous deeds without the daring abilities and opportunities without actualising them in life [Hindupadapada Shahi, 245–4] 4) Political slavery can be easily overthrown at any time. But it is difficult to break the shackles of cultural domination. [Hindupadpadshahi, 242-43] 5) No freedom!, whose smile we shall never resign. Go tell our invaders, the Danes, "That't sweeter to blood for an >age at thy shrine. Than to sleep but a minute in chains!", Quoted by Savarkar, the lines of Thomas Moore (Hindupadapada Shahi, 219) 6) "Rather get killed than converted", This was the prevalent call among Hindus at that time. But Ramdas stood up and exclaimed!, "No, not thus. Get killed rather than converted is good enough but better than that. Do not get either killed nor get violently converted. Rather, Kill the violent forces themselves and get killed while killing to conquer in the cause of righteousness." (Hindupadapada Shahi p.141-62) [8] While discussing the famous Jail Note Book of Bhagat Singh, historians Malwinder Jit Singh and Harish Jain state: Hindu Pad Padshahi by Veer Savarkar is one book which I would list among those he read thoroughly. May be for him, it was a re-reading as it was also found among the books seized by the police during raids on their hideouts after Sukhdev’s arrest. Does this mean Bhagat Singh was in complete agreement with Veer Savarkar? We do not know. The Hindutva of Savarkar was also fiercely non-partisan in its implementation. Perhaps it was a secularism that Bhagat Singh could sympathise with.
Ha, Bhagat Singh, hi ha! You galloped on the gallows, oh hai for us! Rajguru, you ha! Veer Kumar, martyr in National warfare Hi ha! Jai Jai Ha! This ah of today will win tomorrow Royal crown will come home Wore you crown of death before that. We will take arms in our hands The ones with you were killing the enemy! Who is a sinner? Who does not worship the unmatched sanctity of your intentions Go, martyr! We take oath with testimony. the fight with arms is explosive, We are remaining behind you Will fight and win freedom!! Hi Bhagat Singh, Hi Ha! [15]
It is alright if the leftists do not agree with views of Veer Bhagat, but we should not allow them to distort history.
On January 30th, Nathuram Godse assasinated Mohandas Gandhi, the founding father of India, as Mahatma Gandhi conducted a multi-faith prayer meeting because Godse saw him as too accommodating to Muslim interests. Nathuram Godse had long been a member of multiple Hindu nationalist organizations, although the most powerful the RSS (Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh) has disclaimed any assosciation with Godse. Hindu nationalism has deep roots in the politics and history of India stretching back to the 19th century. However, the salience of Hindutva has increased dramatically since the election of Narendra Modi in 2014, who has championed an aggressively Hindu nationalist political philosophy. Modi has succesfully asserted the Hindutva agenda by mass disenfranchisement of suspected undocumented people in the state of Assam, the construction of a temple to Ram in Ayodhya on the rubble of a mosque destroyed by Hindu mobs, and the stripping of the state of Kashmir its political autonomy. However, Hindu nationalism goes beyond just Modi. The purpose of today's podcast episode is to discuss the historical roots, and deep consequences of discrimination against Muslims in India. Riots between Hindus and Muslims, especially where the overwhelming majority of deaths are among Muslims are not a new phenomenon in India. The city of Ahmedabad alone has seen three major waves of communal violence in 1969, 1985 and 2002 where approximately 500, 300 and 2,000 people, the overwhelming majority Muslim lost their lives. India has seen major riots both before and after elections. In recent years, we have seen the disturbing rise of lynchings by groups of vigilantes accusing Muslim men of slaughtering cows. Perhaps most disturbingly, the current Prime Minister of India, Narendra Modi, was Chief Minister of Gujarat at the time of the 2002 riots. Although there is no proof that he planned or had foreknowledge of the violence, he has maintained a conspicuous silence about the atrocities committed while he governed Gujarat. While violence between Hindus against Muslims is often described as the natural anger of the majority community against the minority community, there are many organizations such as the RSS, the VHP (Vishwa Hindu Parishad) and Bajrang Dal organizing people for violence. Underlying this violence between Hindus and Muslims are dangerous logics of communal political and economic competition. The Hindutva movement has long tried to make Hindu identity the most salient identity. For instance, from the 1960s to the 1980s, large numbers of textile workers in the city of Ahmedabad lost their jobs due to government economic mismanagement. Hindu textile workers in general fared worse than their Muslim counterparts as Muslim textile workers tended to be more experienced and were better positioned to set up powerloom businesses. Hindutva agitators worked hard to cast these economic struggles in a communal perspective, and blame Muslims for rising poverty. Moreover, participating in political violence often strengthens identification with the Hindutva movement. In the aftermath of the 2002 riots, the Hindu nationalist BJP gained more votes in areas hit hardest by communal violence, and those police officers who allowed violence to continue consistently saw promotion. There are economic factors behind these of violence as well. Violence against Muslims increases by 5% for every 1% reduction in the growth of Hindu incomes, while violence against Muslims increases dramatically as the economic gap between Hindus and Muslim decreases. The incomplete nature of Indian housing markets is especially relevant, as competition over rent controlled housing units has emerged as one of the most important drivers of Hindu Muslim violence as Muslims are often loathe to move away from rent from rent controlled units, while Hindus wish to acquire this property for themselves and their families. In some towns, such as Surat and many other coastal cities, community leaders worked to keep communal tensions at bay to protect businesses from violence. In many other places the desire to assert political, cultural and social superiority gets tightly wound together with economic motives, in order to ensure all conflict is seen as conflict between Hindus and Muslims. Discrimination against Muslims extends beyond the violence they face from Hindu mobs. India's political and economic system allows for social mobility to those groups that are able to politically organize to grab them. Muslims have been at a disadvantage politically since the partition of India, when the majority of Muslim leadership supported Pakistan and emigrated to Pakistan. Between 1980 and 2019, the percent of India's parliament that was Muslim declined from 10% to 4% despite the fact the Muslim share of the population increased from 11.8% to 14.8% during this same period. There has only been one Muslim Chief Minister of a non-Muslim state so far. The BJP, India's primary Hindu nationalist party, rarely fields Muslim candidates for office due to their own Hindu nationalist ideology. Even secular give little political power. On one hand, secular parties fear being tarred as "appeasing" Muslim interests by Hindu nationalists if they are too closely associated with Muslims, while secular parties can be confident that Muslim voters have nowhere to go even if they largely ignore Muslim issues. The lack of political power has real consequences for India's Muslim community. For example, India runs one of the largest systems of affirmitive action, known as reservations, in the world. However, Muslims have only recently gained limited access to reservations in 2011, although some states offer affirmative action at the state level. The low level of Muslim reservations is striking given many well off communities such as the Jats and Marathas have gained access to quotas showing that political power is more important than group socio-economic status when it comes reservations. The importance of lack of access to government jobs quotas become visible when one looks at Muslim struggles to get government jobs. Only 4% of public sector workers are Muslims, even though Muslims make up 14% of the Muslim population. Lack of access to government jobs is especially important because public sector jobs consistently pay more than double private sector jobs even after taking education into account. Moreover, there is substantial disparities in access to public infrastructure. For example, over 45% of Muslim majority villages have a bus stop, compared to 60% of non-Muslim majority villages, with similar disparities visible in many measures of public investment. Muslims face discrimination in the private sector as well, with formal employers three times more likely to reject identical resumes with Muslim names than Hindu ones, although other studies find no discrimination. I do not want to exagerrate the extent to which Muslims face discrimination in India. Muslims on average have incomes only around 6% lower than the national average. Muslims tend to be better off than Hindus in much of the south and west of India, and in many rural areas. Muslims are in particular disproportionately successful as small and medium size business owners. However, looking in the aggregate it is clear that Muslims have faced consistent downward mobility, with this mobility more evident in education rather than income. At independence, Indian Muslims were similar to Hindus in their level of education. Today, their levels of education are below that of the average Dalit , with declining educational mobility especially concentrated among the children of poor Muslims. The combination of deliberate discrimination, and downward socioeconomic mobility have had disastrous consequences for the Muslim community through the COVID-19 pandemic. India does not collect data on deaths by religion from COVID-19. Muslims make up a vastly disproportionate share of the urban poor, and it is the slums of India's megacities that have been hit hardest by COVID-19. For example, in Mumbai, one study of seroprevalence found that 57% of Mumbai slum dwellers had contracted COVID-19, compared to just 19% of non-slum population, with similar trends in other cities. Much of the Muslim concentration in slums can be explained by the systematic discrimination Muslims face in getting access to housing. On top of this, Muslims have disproportionately faced the burden of Islamophobia through COVID-19. One of the first major superspreading occurred at a convention of the Tablighi Jamaat, a conservative Islamic missionary organization. While it is likely that the Tablighi Jamaat behaved irresponsibly, many Hindutva populations have made not just the Tablighi Jamaat, but the broader Muslim community, a scapegoat for the rise of COVID-19. Prominent politicians have accused Muslims of launching a Corona-Jihad, and misleading videos of Muslim street vendors deliberately spitting on fruit have gone viral. Hospitals have rejected Muslim patients, and many Muslims have faced abuse while getting treatment. Unsurprisingly, resentment has grown in the Muslim community, with public health workers in Juhapura, a ghetto created by Muslims fleeing the Ahmedabad riots of 2002, pelted with stones as they tried to enforce curfew laws. The COVID-19 virus does not differentiate between Hindu and Muslim. Failure to contain COVID-19 in one community will inevitably lead to the spread of COVID-19 to other communities. Similarly, discrimination against Muslims will in the long run rebound against all Indians. Hindu nationalist political parties have gained substantial ground in Indian elections in recent years. If the dominance of parties not committed to secular ideals continues, it is likely structural discrimination against Muslims will be further entrenched. Selected Sources: Communal Riots in Gujarat: Report of a Preliminary Investigation, Ghanshyam Shah From Gandhi to Violence: Ahmedabad's 1985 Riots in Historical Perspective, Howard Spodek The Political Logic of Ethnic Violence: The Anti-Muslim Pogrom in Gujarat, 2002 Raheel Dhattiwala and Michael Biggs The Rise of Hindu Nationalism in India: The Case Study ofAhmedabad in the 1980s, Ornit Shani Economic growth and ethnic violence: An empirical investigation of Hindu–Muslim riots in India , Anjali Bohlen, Ernest Sergenti IMPLICATIONS OF AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF CONFLICT: Hindu-Muslim Violence in India , ANIRBAN MITRA AND DEBRAJ RAY Segregation, Rent Control, and Riots: The Economics of Religious Conflict in an Indian City, Erica Field, Matthew Levinson, Rohini Pande, and Sujata Visaria "UNFINISHED BUSINESS" ETHNIC COMPLEMENTARITIES AND THE POLITICAL CONTAGION OF PEACE AND CONFLICT IN GUJARAT, Saumitra Jha Adjustment and Accommodation: Indian Muslims after Partition, Mushirul Hasan Political Economy of Demand for Quotas by Jats, Patels, and Marathas Dominant or Backward? , Ashwin Deshpande WAGE DIFFERENTIALS BETWEEN THE PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTORS IN INDIA, Elena Glinskaya and Michael Lokshin The Legacy of Social Exclusion A Correspondence Study of Job Discrimination in India, Sukhadeo Thorat Labor market discrimination in Delhi: Evidence from a field experiment, Abhijit Banerjee , Marianne Bertrandy , Saugato Dattaz , Sendhil Mullainathan Wealth Inequality, Class and Caste in India, 1951-2012, Nitin Kumar Bharti Sachar Commission Report, Sachar Commission Intergenerational Mobility in India: Estimates from New Methods and Administrative Data, Sam Asher Paul Novosas Vidya, Veda, and Varna: The Influence of Religion and Caste on Education in Rural India, Vani Boorah, Sriya Iyer For whom does the phone (not) ring? Discrimination in the rental housing market in Delhi, India, Saugatta Datta www.wealthofnationspodcast.comhttps://media.blubrry.com/wealthofnationspodcast/s/content.blubrry.com/wealthofnationspodcast/China-Tech.mp3
Kejriwal is making a fool out of people and AAP does not deserve to be voted into the State Legislature. Read the post before downvoting blindly.
Jan Lokpal Bill If AAP forms the delhi state government, what can they do ? They CANNOT touch/modify CBI. They will not be able to make CBI independent since this will come under powers of Central Government. We all know making CBI independent is one of the MOST important aspects of strong independent Lokpal. Other wise Lokpal will not have investigative and arresting powers. If AAP comes the power and they pass Lokpal bill in 15 days, that Lokpal will again be like the Jokepal proposed by Khangress (for the above mentioned reason). Basically Kejriwal is cheating/fooling people in this regard by just screaming JLP JLP and not going into details. Independent CBI see above Swaraj Their vision of swaraj talks about empowering the Gram Panchayats. AFAIK, there arent many rural areas in NCR. Right to reject/Right to recall, Referendum Style Out of state government purview High command culture AAP already has a high command culture in place. Supreme leader kejriwal and his minions like Y Yadav, Ilmi, Kumar vishwas etc ARE the high command of AAP. Ex-AAP members were pissed off about this thing. Politicians with criminal records No doubt AAP (as yet) has a better record on this than Khangress, SP, BSP, BJP etc .But the whole Deshraj Raghav thing and "2nd RTI" bullshit should have been dealt better. AAP loses clean image if this continues. The speed with which they gave clean chit to their senior leaders (in the recent sting) is worrisome. Lest AAP become another clean chit giving machine (like Scamgress.) Public money on VIPs AAP is EXTREMELY stupid on this. Kejriwal talks about no security for elected MLAs, MPs. But what are the possible repercussions ? Tomorrow if Kejriwal became CM and was abducted by Terrorists or Naxalites, who's gonna be responsible? What if terrorists,Naxals hold politicians, MPs, MLAs etc hostage and demand release of their brethren from jail ? Our country is gonna be fucked. And it has happened before in the Naxal affected areas. Support to strict laws rhetoric Transparency in donations While in theory, this could be good, its a problem for Corporates. Now, please talk to any business family/conglomerate to understand why this is a problem. Business families are often coerced/coaxed/influenced by local units of parties to donate to election funds of parties and these businesses have to oblige. Often, business houses will do it themselves (willingly) to curry favour with the political parties. If everything becomes open, it will be a problem since there will be a perpetual witch-hunt against those who ended up funding the losing party. This is why if you see, big houses like Tata etc donate to BOTH, INC and BJP. They HAVE to play it safe party under RTI RTI will have to be amended at the Center
March 5: Lok Sabha Elections 2014 announced & attack on BJP HQ after faking detention of Arvind Kejriwal
March 6: Car window shield of Arvind Kejriwal and Manish Sisodia broken
March 7: Attempt to gate crash to Narendra Modi's house & take a chartered flight for an event invitation that was most likely scheduled many weeks in advance
March 8: Ink smeared on Yogendra Yadav's face
March 9: Modi called a property dealer for Ambanis, Tatas and Adani
March 10: Aaj Tak video leak
March 11:
March 12: Vandalism at Churchgate station by AAP
March 13: Gun to the head rumor / comment of Arvind Kejriwal preferring Modi over Mayawati for PM if forced to choose between the two.
March 14: Arvind Kejriwal claiming all media houses are paid big sums of money to promote Modi. Also, alleged to have said that he will send such journalists to jail.
March 15: Arvind Kejriwal continues attacking the media by saying that they have no guts to show negative news about Modi and violence between AAP / Congress supporters in Amethi (Kumar Vishwas)
Background: No publicity is bad publicity. AAP wants to ensure that it remains in the prime time news.
Kumar Vishwas News अपडेट संसद में 70 मिनट बोले PM, विपक्ष की चुटकी ले बोले- शादी में फूफी भी रूठ जाती हैं, लगे ठहाके; गुलाम, ब्रायन, प्रताप को भी घेरा Kumar Vishwas's car stolen from outside Indirapuram house. Ghaziabad Police have registered a case in this matter. Kumar Vishwas Kumar Vishwas' car stolen from outside his house in Ghaziabad. According to the police, the car was parked outside the house of Kumar Vishwas at his Indrapuram house till late Friday night. Kumar Vishwas' car stolen from outside his house in Ghaziabad According to the police, the car was parked outside the house of Kumar Vishwas at his Indrapuram house till late Friday night. Feb 15, 2020, 14:48 PM IST Kumar Vishwas’s SUV stolen from house in Ghaziabad, teams formed for investigation According to the police, the car was parked outside the house of Kumar Vishwas at his Indrapuram house till late Friday night. By Newsd Updated on : Sat 15th February 2020, 02:38 PM. Follow Newsd On For Any Enquiries Please Email. [email protected]. Facebook-f Twitter Instagram Youtube Kumar Vishwas's manager filed a complaint with police about the theft of his luxury SUV car which was parked outside the former AAP leader's house. Kumar Vishwas lives with his family in Vasundhara Sector 3. Famous Hindi poet Kumar Vishwas’s SUV was stolen from outside his house in Indirapuram on Friday night. His SUV Toyota Fortuner was parked outside the house before it was lifted by the burglars. Ghaziabad police have registered a case in this matter and several teams have been formed to investigate the matter. Kumar Vishwas House: कुमार विश्वास देश के लोकप्रिय हिंदी कवि हैं। वह अपनी रचनाओं के लिए देश-दुनिया में विख्यात हैं। कवि सम्मेलनों के अलावा कुमार विश्वास राजनीति Hindi poet Kumar Vishwas’ car has been stolen from outside his house in Indirapuram, Ghaziabad. The police have registered a case and several teams have been formed to nab the culprit.
Dr Kumar Vishwas enthralls thousands of audiences at Muscat, Oman in his first tour of the country.Follow us on :- YouTube :- http://youtube.com/KumarVishwas... In this Ahmedabad video Dr. Kumar Vishwas made People roll out of chair. Follow us on :- YouTube :- http://youtube.com/KumarVishwasFacebook :- https://www.fa... Official Channel of Dr Kumar Vishvas Dr Kumar Vishwas is the most renowned performer poet of Hindi and Urdu language in the world. Besides having performed in more than 5000 LIVE musical, non ... कवि kumar vishwas का नया अवतार। जब कुमार विश्वास ने किया प्रधानमंत्री ... Kapil Mishra sitting in protest in front of Kumar Vishwas house. Watch the full segment for more details. India 24x7 takes news beyond reporting. We bring perspective to every issue and how it ... #HarivanshRaiBachchan जी की बेहद लोकप्रिय कविता #Madhushala को सुनिए Dr.Kumar Vishwas की आवाज़ में !राम की ... Poet Dr Kumar Vishwas in a electrifying performance at Rang Sharda Auditorium, Bandra, Mumbai on 10 Oct 2014
